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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

.STATE OF UTAH
EDITH CHLOE MATHIE,
PlaintNf and Appellant)

vs.

Case No. 9345

WILLIAM TRUMAN MATHIE,
Defendant rand Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff was awarded a decree of divorce from the
defendant concerning which there is no issue raised by
either party. This appeal questions the findings and conclusions with respect to the allocation and disposition
of property and property interests, the objections to
which are substantially delineated in the motion for new
trial (R. 149-150), and as hereinafter more particularly
referred to.
The parties were married on February 28, 1946. The
defendant is 53 years of age (R. 75), a former school
teacher (R. 48) and at the time of the divorce was driv-
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ing a truck for a cleaning company for a gross salary of
$60.00 a week (R. 76). The plaintiff, who is 52 years of
age, has a background of Civil Service employment, employment as a waitress, cook, boarding house operator
and teacher (R. 37-38). At the time of the divorce plaintiff was employed by the State Liquor Commission (R.
36) at a gross salary of $260.00 a month (R. 51). Both
parties have been previously married and divorced and
both suffer from heart conditions (Ex. 1 and 2), the
plaintiff's condition being organic since her birth (R. 36).
The only substantial property involved is a home
and adjacent apartment on South 7th East Street in Salt
Lake City, considered as one unit, which was purchased
for the total price of $13,500.00 in 1947. The initial down
payment of $4,000.00 was made by plaintiff from funds
accumulated by her prior to the marriage (R. 24, 61).
Defendant has never made a payment on the property
(R. 91) which has a present market value of $25,000.00
(R. 104), but over the years contributed approximately
$2,300.00 for remodeling (R. 142). Monthly payments on
the purchase price and taxes were made hy the plaintiff
fron1 her own funds or from the rent money. The last
payment of $700.00 was made by plaintiff's daughter in
October of 1949 (R. 25, 35, 40 and 48), whereupon plaintiff conveyed the property to her daughter (R. 35).
A previous divorce action was commenced by the
plaintiff in August of 1953 (R. 5). This action terminated
in December of that year and the parties executed a reconciliation agreement (Ex. 2). By the agreement of
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December 5, 1953, the defendant acknowledges plaintiff's
ownership in the property and the plaintiff agreed to
execute a Will granting to defendant a life estate to the
property in the event of her prior death. The "\Vill was
duly executed (Ex. 4).
The decree awards possession of the portion of the
property occupied as a home to plaintiff and awards possession of the rental units to defendant with the right to
evict the plaintiff as a tenant unless he is paid the same
rental as would be required from a stranger. The horne
and the rental units are required to be held in trust "for
equitable distribution" of expenses and income beginning
as of June 23, 1960 ''and the parties shall pro-rate all of
the utilities, and rents due and that the income and expenses be enjoyed and borne fifty percent by each party."
The decree then provides that the property can only be
sold by the mutual consent of the parties (R. 147), in
which event one-half of the sale price shall be divided
after plaintiff has received $2,500.00 therefrom "and,
in the event the said real property is not sold, then at the
death of the defendant, plaintiff & defendant having
used the premises for their living expenses and normal
pursuits in life, the property be distributed to the plaintiff, her heirs devisees & legatees." (R. 148).
Since the decree Coy Moore, plaintiff's daughter,
and her daughter's husband have reconveyed the property to plaintiff.
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STATE!1:ENTS OF POINTS
POINT I. THE FINDINGS AND DECREE OF THE
COURT AWARDING TO DEFENDANT AN INTEREST IN
THE APARTMENT AND HOME GREATER THAN THAT
PROVIDED IN THE RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT ARE
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW.
POINT II. THE DISPOSITION OF THE PROPERTY
IS SO INEQUITABLE AND UN JUST THAT IT MANIFESTS
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL JUDGE AND
SHOULD BE CORRECTED.
POINT III. THE COURT.'S DECREE IS UNCERTAIN,
AMBIGUOUS AND INEQUITABLE.

ARGUJ\fENT
POINT I. THE FINDINGS AND DECREE OF THE
COURT AWARDING TO DEFENDANT AN INTEREST IN
THE APARTMENT AND HOME GREATER THAN THAT
PROVIDED IN 'THE RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT ARE
CONTRARY TO 'THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW.

The reconciliation agreement of the 5th day of December, 1953, gives plaintiff the beneficial ownership
of the property during her lifetime. The agreement is a
valid and binding contract which the court cannot alter,
amend or modify to the detriment of either party. Annotation, 11 A.L.R. 277.
In the case of Levine v. Levine (Ga. 1948), 4 A.L.R.
2d 1205, 49 S.E. 2d 814, plaintiff separated from defendant because of his cruel treatment and thereafter a reconciliation occurred. The defendant executed a deed for
the consideration of the plaintiff, his wife, becoming rec-
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onciled and returning to live with him. Subsequently
plaintiff cominenced a suit for divorce at which time defendant claimed that plaintiff by her present suit had
elected to rescind the reconciliation contract and that the
deed should be cancelled. The trial court held in favor
of defendent and ordered the plaintiff as a condition of
trying her case on its merits to reconvey the property to
the defendant. On appeal the Supreme Court held that
the plaintiff had paid and satisfied in full any consideration requiring her to become reconciled and return to
her husband and that by virtue of the deed she was the
owner absolute of the title conveyed. The court states :
"It would be a novel legal principle that would
compel this wife to suffer his breach o;r else, as a
penalty for seeking redress, surrender that which
he had freely given as an inducement for her return to him."
The valid and binding effect of reconciliation agreements
is also recognized in the following cases: Campbell v.
Prater (Wyo. 1948), 191 P. 2d 160; Tyson V. Tyson
(Ariz. 1944), 149 P. 2d 674; Bowden v. Bowden (CaL
1917), 167 P. 154; Schwab v. Schwab (Cal. 1959), 335
P.2d 174.
The trial court in the instant case, by its oral findings and again in its written findings, acknowledges the
existence of the agreement and then proceeds to erroneously interpret the agreement to the prejudice of plaintiff. The agreement gives to the defendant a life estate
to take effect upon the death of plaintiff. To give to the
defendant a greater interest in the property than he has
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under the agreement would be to compel plaintiff to suffer defendant's breach, or else, as a penalty for seeking
redress, surrender that which defendent had freely given
as an inducement for plaintiff returning to him. The
plaintiff under the agreement became the absolute owner
of the property, subject only to a life estate in the event
she predeceases the defendant.
The court by awarding to defendant a present interest in the home and apartment house rewrites the
agreement of the parties of DecerDber 5, 1953, contrary
to the evidence and the law.
POINT II. THE DISPOSITION OF THE PROPERTY
IS SO INEQUITABLE AND UNJUST THAT rr MANIFESTS
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL JUDGE AND
SHOULD BE CORRECTED.

The findings of fact and decree relating to the home
and apartment house, together with the court's comments, evidence considerable vindictiveness. Upon learning of the deed given by plaintiff to her daughter for a
consideration of $700.00, which conveyance is not condoned and has since been corrected, the trial Judge lost sight
of the equities as is disclosed by the following quotations
from the record :
"THE COURT: Mr. Reid, I think this property ought to be conveyed back into her name, so
it can be adjudicated.
I think the conveyance was not honest. She
apparently let it go for $700. She cannot dissipate
money or property in the hands of the court to
distribute.
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* * *
THE COURT: You think that over between
now and two. The Court would like possession of
that property in order to properly decide this
case." (R. 118).
1
'

THE C01JRT *

* *

She has a bank account at this time, and the
distribution of that account is she may have that
account. However, the plaintiff is restrained from
now, in drawing anything from that account until
the title to the real estate is cleared up, and the
cloud placed upon it by the deed from the plaintiff
to her daughter.
The Court construes this as a method of trying to conceal the property and get it out of the
reach of the court, and it is improper conduct on
the part of the plaintiff and her daughter in making this transaction.
As part of the security to protect the defendant in getting the title cleared up, this bank account that has been described in the sum of about
$50.00 is ordered left intact, so that if the defendant needs to, he may levy upon it and use it for
the purp·ose of clearing the title to the property.

* * *
The Court awards to the plaintiff attorneys
fees. The attorneys fees have been described as
being worth $500, and they may be. The Court
does not have to pass on that subject, but IT IS
ORDERED that the defendant pay his own fees,
that he also pay to the plaintiff $300 to assist the
plaintiff in paying her fees. The defendant need
not make this payment of $300 until after the title
to the property is cleared up from the cloud that
the court has heretofore referred to.
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* * *
The Court is of the opinion that the deed to
the daughter is a nullity, except that it amounts
to a cloud that has to be cleared up either by the
consent of the plaintiff, which may be done without cost, or by the action of Court, at her expense." (R. 121-122)
"IT. IS FURTHER ORDERED that the expenses of the defendant that will be incurred and
necessary in quieting title to this property from
the cloud in the nature of a deed given by the
plaintiff to her daughter, should be horne by the
plaintiff; that includes court costs, attorneys's
fees, abstracting, and any necessary expense toward the clearing of that title." (R. 123.)
"THE COURT I am going to leave that with
a life interest. She tried to steal that from him."
(R. 133).
From reading the foregoing statements of the trial
court it becomes apparent that the court was following
a course of conduct similar to that condemned in the case
of Foreman v. Foreman, 111 Utah 72, 176 P.2d 144,
wherein it was said that the trial court in part attempted
to compensate the plaintiff for "her suffering of the
pangs of unrequited love - heart balm - and teach Mr.
Foreman a lesson in marriage. Neither task is properly
within the issues of a divorce case such as this." This
court in the Foreman case stated:
''In the case at bar the reasons the judge recited in open court for his decision are not consistent with his findings of fact, conclusions of
law and decree. They cast doubt upon the foundation for those determinations. It is a simple mat-
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ter to recite or write sufficient facts to support
a decision once the decision is made, but the trial
court's process of determination to be a proper
exercise of judgment for founding a question
upon the merits should show an attempt to decide
the issues of the case as presented, and should not
be founded upon extraneous matters."
In the case of Wilson v. Wi!lson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296
P.2d 977, this court comments on punitive measures in
a divorce judgment and states as follows:
"We recognize that there is no authority in
our law for administering punitive measures in a
divorce judgment, and that to do so would be
improper, * * * "
In the instant matter the court imposes vindictive
punishment upon plaintiff because of the ill-advised conveyance given by plaintiff to her daughter. Such conduct
is not properly within the issues of this case. The reasons
of the Judge cited in open court for his decision cast
doubt upon the foundation for his determination. The
trial court's process of determination, to he a proper
exercise of judgment for deciding a question upon the
merits, should show an attempt to decide the issues of the
case as presented and not upon extraneous matters.
Foreman v. Foreman, supra.
Since divorce proceedings are equitable actions, the
parties are entitled to the judgment of this court as well
as that of the trial court. Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah
157, 292 P. 214. Where there exists an unjust distribution of the property as exists in this matter, the Supreme
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Court should review the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. M.artinette v. Martimette,
8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P .2d 821.
Within the guideposts set out in MacDonald v. Mac~
Donald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 10G6, the plaintiff should
have been awarded the entire interest in the home and
rental units, assuming that the court will not, as a matter
of public policy, adopt the rule applied in other jurisdictions to the reconciliation agreement. In the instant case
there has been no community of interest, each party living substantially on their respective earnings. The real
estate was acquired by the separate property of the
plaintiff and the contributions that the defendant has
made for remodeling, totaling some $2,300.00 over a
period of approximately thirteen years, is less than the
equivalent of rental for his occupancy.
POINT III. THE COURT'S DECREE IS UNCERTAIN,
AMBIGUOUS AND INEQUITABLE.

An examination of the record in the instant matter
discloses that the trial court intended to give defendant
no more than he acquired under the agreement of December 5, 1953 (Ex. 2). In the court's oral findings the
court states:
"The Court is mindful of the agreement the
parties entered into when they reunited after
their last complaint was filed in the previous case.
The defendant has not lost any rights that he may
have acquired or had in that agreement." (R.120).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
The court did not intend to grant to the defendant a
permanent interest in the home .and apartment house,
but intended to create only a semblance of control until
such time as plaintiff secured a deed of conveyance reconveying the property from plaintiff's daughter. During the argument on the Inotion for a new trial attention
was called to the fact that there was nothing in the findings with respect to an obligation to pay rent for the
use of the home as distinguished from the rental units
(R. 127), and yet in paragraph 9 of the decree (R. 147)
the home and the rental units are "in trust'' for an equitable distribution of income. As to this the court said:

"I cannot remember that provision, but reading it now, it looks like it was merely an arrangement so they could get together on what you might
call 'a closing statement for a real estate sale.'
They have some expenses and income to pro
rate. For example, a tenant may have paid her
the rent in June for the period which was awarded
to him, and she may have paid some expenses in
advance, so they would have to pro rate it.
All it would take is for somebody to get together and say, 'As of this date· you owe the pro
rata expenses' and that ought to settle any-liability on the property, save that settlement. The effort was to hold a string on the· property until
they made a clean separation as of the date specified, June 23rd." (R. 127).
Attention was then called to the retention of the use of the
bank account, the restraint on the payment of attorneys'
fees until plaintiff had cleared the title to the property
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and the right of the defendant to evict the plaintiff from
the rental units. The court then made the comment: "The
house was awarded to her." (R. 128).
Paragraph 9 of the decree was again called to the
court's attention and the court made the observation:
"That is just to make a settlement." (R.128).
To compound the confusion the court attributed to
the decree the intention to give plaintiff the home free
and clear after unspecified and undetermined reimbursements had been made as of June 23, 1960 (R. 129).
The fact of the matter is that the decree remains
ambiguous and uncertain and, as pointed out above,
makes an inequitable allocation and distribution of the
property. The lip service on the subject of sale is unrealistic and unworkable, requiring two estranged people to
join therein and, in the absence of their mutual consent,
permits the defendant to dissipate all substantial rental
for upkeep and repairs at his sole election. The plaintiff,
notwithstanding her grievances against the defendant
justifying a divorce in her favor, has, to all intents and
purposes, been deprived of the beneficial use and enjoyn1ent of property acquired by. her sole and separate
rneans. At pretrial her right to alimony was waived (R.
11), thus making her reliance upon her own resources
and accumulations of controlling importance. The inequities are apparent.
The transcript of the argument on the motion for a
new trial (R. 124-136) reveals the confusion on the part
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of the court not only as to the record but, what is more
important, as to the meaning and the intent of the decree
and the findings to support it, the guideposts by which
the parties are to be directed. After the court had attempted to correct certain facets of the decree by interlineation and had resolved the remaining objections against
plaintiff and after the matter was effectively brought to
an end short of an appeal by the denial of the motion for
new trial, the court said :
"The Court asks counsel to get together and
just discuss it, and if an ambiguity, to see if you
can work it out, and stipulate to cure it, within
the ~ntention of the Court." (R. 136).
While there is much to be said in favor of the innovations afforded by our Rules of Civil Procedure to
expedite and terminate litigation, we respectfully suggest
that our procedures are not yet mellowed to the point
where a court can effectively delegate to the attorneys
in adversary proceedings the task indicated above. We
submit that it is still the function of the court to resolve
the issue and not to leave to the partisan views of counsel
the impossible task of determining what might be ''within the intention of the Court," particularly after the
Judge has terminated his role and turned his attention
to other matters.

CONCLUSION
The property rights are of extreme importance to
the parties in the instant case. There is nothing in the
record that justifies a property award to the defendant.
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The decree should be corrected by this Court, or the
judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded
with such instructions as to this Court may seem agreeable to the equitable considerations of the position of the
respective parties.
Respectfully submitted,

GUSTIN, RICHARDS &
MATTS SON
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant
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